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Abstract 
This paper introduces and illustrates a critical realist approach to the practice of 
strategy, combining Archer’s stratified ontology for structure, culture and agency, with 
her work on reflexivity, to provide strategy-as-practice with an innovative theoretical 
lens. By maintaining the ontic differentiation between structure and agency this 
approach renders the conditions of action analytically separable from the action itself, 
thereby facilitating the examination of their interplay, one upon the other, at variance 
through time, in strategy formation and strategizing. It therefore offers the field a 
fruitful methodological means of exploring the increasingly complex empirical 
implications of some practice theoretical claims. 
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Introduction 
Strategy-as-practice (hereafter SAP) has emerged as a discrete stream within the 
broader current of practice-based theorizing in contemporary sociology (Golsorkhi, 
Rouleau, Seidl, & Vaara, 2010; Jarzabkowski, 2005; Johnson, Langley, Melin, & 
Whittington, 2007). In drawing upon sociological theories of practice, which redirect 
the conceptualization of strategy from the possession of an organization to an activity 
that its members perform, it has enriched the strategy research agenda (Jarzabkowski, 
Balogun, & Seidl, 2007). But in focusing the debate upon the micro activities 
constituting the real-time practices in the workplace a legacy of ‘micro-myopia’ taints 
the field (Vaara & Whittington, 2012, p. 28). This limits its potential to transcend 
divisions within strategy research and foster insights of greater salience for strategy 
academics and practitioners (Johnson, Melin, & Whittington, 2003). 
Two pivotal reviews of the developing field highlight this dilemma. Jarzabkowski 
and Spee (2009) note that, despite consistent iteration in the research agenda, 
understanding of the links between macro societal phenomena and micro managerial 
actions remain underdeveloped within SAP. Furthermore, Vaara and Whittington 
(2012) have reasserted this stance and called for SAP to address agency within the 
broader context of the macro-institutional nature of social practices. For this burgeoning 
field to mature further it must therefore address one of the most fundamental issues in 
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contemporary social analysis: how strategy, as a situated, socially accomplished 
activity, is shaped by the interplay of structure and agency (Golsorkhi et al., 2010).  
In Whittington’s (2006a, 2006b) view, the central issue is to loop together macro 
extra-organizational societal forces with micro intra-organizational strategic managerial 
activities to determine their interplay in strategizing and not simply reduce these former 
forces to an undefined organizational context. But the mutual constitution of structure 
and agency, generally subscribed by practice theorists, rejects their manifestation as 
distinct entities (Orlikowski, 2010). The conditions of action are thus rendered 
analytically inseparable from the action itself. Therefore, though the ‘interpenetration’ 
of structure and agency may be explored in SAP, the analysis of their interplay, one 
upon the other, at variance through time, is obscured (Archer, 1995, p. 15). 
In the spirit of Reed (1997), this paper seeks to rethink the interplay of structure 
and agency in strategy formation and strategizing. It presents a meta-theoretical debate 
that is informed by Archer’s realist social theory, and employs her stratified ontology 
for structure (1995), culture (1996), and agency (2000a), with her later work on 
reflexivity (2003, 2007, 2010a, 2012), to offer SAP an innovative non-conflationary 
theoretical lens. An Archerian approach maintains the ontic differentiation between 
structure and agency. Hence, the ontological and conceptual entanglements, which 
obscure the analysis of their interplay, are unravelled. Indeed, structural, cultural, 
relational, and temporal dimensions are accommodated, together with their mediation to 
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the agent via reflexive deliberation or non-reflexive socialisation (habitus/habituation), 
thereby depicting social practice as the outcome of such nuanced interplay. This offers 
SAP a fruitful methodological means of exploring the increasingly complex empirical 
implications of some practice theoretical claims. 
To illuminate this meta-theoretical debate, an Archerian approach to the practice 
of strategy is demonstrated through an empirical case study of strategizing in the Welsh 
Government (Herepath, 2010). Revealed through the ‘naturalistic immersion’ of the 
author’s former role as a government strategist, this contribution is noteworthy for the 
privileged access, and thus insight, it offers the field (Greenhalgh et al., 2009, p. 397). 
The interplay of structure and agency is captured through strategists’ perceptions of 
their ‘social context and personal concerns’ (Archer, 2012, p. 7). As role incumbents, 
each differently positioned and conditioned by structural constraints and enablements, 
their vested interests and discordant paths for strategic action emerge from the social 
position, role-based and institutional—professional and organizational—orientations of 
individuals and collectives (Archer, 2000b; Porpora, 1998).  
An Archerian approach demonstrates that strategists’ actions are moulded by deep 
structures, and the ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ that emanates from the hierarchical and 
bureaucratic relational array within which they are embedded (Lukes, 1974, p. 30). Yet 
this is counterpoised by the improvised ‘in situ coping’ of their reflexive deliberation 
(Chia, 2004, p. 33). This approach therefore penetrates to the crux of Whittington’s 
 4 
(2006a) notion of looping by portraying the acts of the strategist as simultaneously 
‘constrained and yet free’ (Archer, 1995, p. 1). Moreover, it gives form to the latitude in 
the margins—that elusive cognitive ‘entrepreneurial space’ (Hoffman & Ventresca, 
1999, p. 1374)—whereby the strategist perceives the boundaries of their strategic 
discretion and scopes out their leverage to play in alignment to, or indeed against, the 
situational logic that manifests within the strategic arena. As such, it may help the field 
glean insight into the fundamental question that surfaces when one reflects upon the 
complexities of strategy and strategizing—‘why?’—why do strategists do precisely 
what they do in their daily praxis?  
The remainder of this paper is presented in four sections. First, structure and 
agency in SAP are considered through the work of Bourdieu, Giddens, Heidegger and 
Schatzki. Archer’s realist social theory, focused upon the morphogenetic-morphostatic 
cycle and her conceptualization of reflexive deliberation, is then discussed to define the 
paper’s ontological and theoretical orientation. Next, an Archerian approach to the 
practice of strategy is demonstrated through the empirical case study. Finally, the 
discussion and conclusion consider the opportunities, benefits and challenges that this 
approach offers SAP, highlighting connections to the parent strategy field and process 
research agendas.  
Structure and agency in strategy-as-practice 
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SAP studies informed by different practice theorists generally subscribe to the mutual 
constitution or ‘central conflation’ of structure and agency (Archer, 1995, p. 14; 
Orlikowski, 2010). For example, Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) theory of practice adheres to 
a non-Cartesian social ontology that attempts to dissolve the dichotomy of structure and 
agency by perceiving practice as the means through which the ‘objective world and 
subjective actor come together’ (Vaara & Whittington, 2012, p. 4). This stance centres 
on Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of ‘habitus’ as a structuring mechanism—‘a system of 
durable transposable [agential] dispositions, structured structures predisposed to 
function as structuring structures’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72)—that operates in a non-
reflexive manner at times of ‘contextual continuity’, only shifting into a reflexive mode 
in moments of ‘crisis’ triggered by ‘contextual discontinuity or incongruity’ (Archer, 
2012, p. 17; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 131). 
SAP studies adhering to a Bourdieusian approach recognize the routine and 
recursive nature of practice embedded within institutional structures (Jarzabkowski, 
2004). Furthermore, through Bourdieu’s (1993) notions of field, agential position and 
capital (economic, social, and cultural) they illustrate the role of structure and agency in 
the power struggles, which defend or subvert practice, so highlighting the ‘creative 
dimension’ of habitus (Gomez & Bouty, 2011, p. 925). Yet Bourdieu’s ontological 
position underplays the role of conscious thought and thus reflexivity—‘the regular 
exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in 
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relation to their (social) context and vice versa’ (Archer, 2007, p. 4)—in the 
development and operation of habitus (Elder-Vass, 2007). Consequently, when 
perceived through Bourdieu’s (1990, p. 92) ‘logic of practice’, strategizing, comprising 
the ‘actions, interactions and negotiations of multiple actors and the situated practices 
that they draw upon in accomplishing that [strategic] activity’ (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2007, p. 8), is viewed to operate under a ‘logic in itself’ without ‘conscious reflection or 
logical control’. Yet the dynamic nature of strategy, beyond the bounds of crisis, 
demands intentionality and a rational, albeit fallible, strategic logic. This approach thus 
poses a risk of underestimating the role of reflexivity in strategizing. 
Mutual constitution is also exemplified in Giddens’ (1976, 1979, 1984) 
structuration theory and his conceptualisation of the duality of structure. Underpinned 
by the ontology of praxis, structure is understood ‘paradigmatically’ as a generic 
concept that manifests in the structural properties of social systems, being conveyed 
through rules and resources, which remain virtual until instantiated into action 
(Orlikowski, 1992, p. 404). In contrast to Bourdieu, Giddens (1984) attributes 
reflexivity to human actors, acknowledging that the enactment of practical knowledge 
demands reflexive monitoring to achieve a competent performance (Gherardi, 2000). 
Agency is therefore moulded by a practical consciousness and structures of signification 
(interpretive schemes), domination (resource allocative and authoritative), and 
legitimation (norms defining the moral order) drawn upon from the institutional realm.  
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SAP studies adopting a Giddensian approach have employed ‘methodological 
bracketing’ to examine praxis (the activity of strategizing), practices (strategy’s 
routines, tool-usages, and norms), and the practitioners (the people engaged in strategy) 
in the profession of strategy as an institutional field (Whittington, 2006a). Informed by 
Reckwitz’s (2002, p. 249) distinction between practice (praxis in German) and practices 
(praktiken), such studies depict praxis and practices as mutually constitutive (Vaara & 
Whittington, 2012). Giddensian approaches have also captured the human labour in 
strategy across tiers of management (Mantere, 2005, 2008), and analysed the patterns of 
strategizing behaviours through which managers shape strategy within the action and 
institutional realm (Jarzabkowski, 2008). But as noted by Whittington (2010, p. 114), 
the ‘structural pliability’ conceptualised by Giddens (1976, p. 75), wherein ‘the 
individual could have acted otherwise’ represents, for some, exaggerated scope for 
agential voluntarism (Archer, 1982; Reed, 2005). 
The work of Heidegger (1927, 1954) has informed the development of practice-
theoretical approaches (Nicolini, 2009; Zundel & Kokkalis, 2010). However, in SAP, it 
is his exploration of being, and notably his conceptualisation of dwelling and building 
modes, which have been employed to nuanced effect (2008 [1962], p. 78-90). Chia and 
Holt (2006) re-conceptualize agency and strategic action within a dwelling mode, in 
which agents enact their practical dealings with an absorbed intentionality, termed 
‘availableness’, that is ‘prior to mental representation and deliberate intentional action’ 
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(Chia & Holt, 2006, p. 641). In this regard, they illustrate the immanent nature of 
strategy, depicting strategists’ actions as in situ practical coping that manifests in a 
‘non-deliberate’ and somewhat ‘mindless’ manner until confronted by failure 
whereupon a building mode ensues that catalyses conscious reflection and deliberate 
intention.  
This is echoed in the work of Sandberg and Dall’Alba (2009, p. 1351) who draw 
upon Heidegger, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to reveal how practice is constituted 
through the ‘entwinement of life with world’. But in perceiving practice through the 
interplay of the lived body and ways of being, via purposive enactment that is imbued 
with meaning, with others, and things, within the social world, the interplay of structure 
and agency is obscured by their very entwinement. 
The inexorable interweaving of structure and agency is conveyed by Schatzki’s 
(2001) meta-theoretical approach. Positing the ontological primacy of practice wherein 
‘the social is a field of embodied, materially interwoven practices centrally organized 
around shared practical understanding’ (Schatzki, 2001, p. 3), it expresses the 
intersection of individual activity, contextualised practical intelligibility, and the social 
order that is central to practice theory (Orlikowski, 2010; Schatzki, 2005). But in 
depicting social practices as the ‘smallest unit’ of analysis, an ‘ontological 
entanglement’ arises through which the ontic differentiation between structure, agency, 
and ensuing practice is lost (Orlikowski, 2010, p. 27; Reckwitz, 2002, p. 249). Once 
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more, SAP is unable to attain its goal of exploring how strategy is shaped by the 
interplay of structure and agency as this approach obscures their action as distinct 
entities, endowed with different causal powers, operating across time and space in the 
social world.  
To explore the interplay of structure and agency this paper asserts that a non-
conflationary ontological position is required. Hence one that: (i) recognises the ontic 
differentiation between social structures and agents; (ii) rejects both methodological and 
ontological individualism and collectivism; (iii) recognises the dependence of social 
structures upon agents, and the dependence of agents upon social structures; (iv) 
accords the temporal priority of social structures over any one agent, whilst 
acknowledging that structural elaboration post-dates the agency that gives it form; and 
(v) accommodates habituation to guide routine action and reflexivity to guide those 
actions which demand a more creative response in strategizing (Archer, 1995; 
Fleetwood, 2008; Hodgson, 2004). Thus, the approach adopted is Archer’s realist social 
theory. 
Archer’s realist social theory 
How strategy and strategizing are shaped by the interplay of structure and agency 
focuses the debate upon the ‘great divide’ of social theory (Fuchs, 2001, p. 25). Since 
the 1970s Archer has examined this issue, building upon Bhaskar’s variant of critical 
realism to formulate her realist social theory. [See Bhaskar, (1978); Fleetwood & 
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Ackroyd, (2004) for an introduction to critical realism.] Archer therefore endorses a 
stratified ontology for structure, culture, and agency, refined through her later work on 
reflexivity, which she combines with the temporal dimension of social transformation or 
reproduction to produce the morphogenetic-morphostatic cycle (Archer, 1995). 
Archer adopts the concept of morphogenesis from Buckley (1967, p. 58); who, 
from a systems theory perspective, used this notion to capture ‘those processes which 
tend to elaborate or change a system’s given form, structure or state’. Morphogenesis 
conveys that society has no pre-set form. Indeed, it recognises that society takes its 
shape from, and is formed by, agents, through the intended and unintended 
consequences of their activities. This stance, Archer (2012) asserts, laudably wards off 
charges about the reification of structural and cultural emergent properties. Hence this 
‘unlovely term’ depicts the ‘radical and unpredictable re-shaping of society as a 
consequence of the interplay of structure and agency’ (Archer, 1995, p. 75). 
Morphostasis, in contrast, refers to those ‘processes which tend to preserve or maintain 
a system’s given form, organization or state’ (Archer, 1995, p. 166).  
As illustrated in Figure 1, Archer embraces the notion that structure and agency 
are different emergent strata of social reality that work across different tracts of time. 
The flow of a morphogenetic-morphostatic cycle is therefore broken up into three 
phases: structural conditioning (T1-T2), socio-cultural interaction (T2-T3), and 
structural reproduction or elaboration (T3-T4). Hence, Archer argues that the analytical 
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differentiation between structure and agency is made possible by two propositions: ‘that 
structure necessarily pre-dates the actions which transform it and that structural 
elaboration necessarily post-dates these actions’ (Archer, 2000b, p. 465). In this 
manner, Archer employs ‘analytical dualism’ as the guiding methodological principle 
underpinning her non-conflationary social theorizing (Archer, 1995, p. 15; Stones, 
2001). 
By maintaining the ontic differentiation between structure and agency the 
conditions of action are therefore rendered analytically separable from the action itself, 
so enabling their interplay, as opposed to their mutual interpenetration, to be explored. 
This approach helps to clarify how structural and cultural conditioning effectively 
influences socio-cultural interaction, and what forms of social interaction foster 
structural and cultural reproduction or change. Consequently, for SAP, the problematic 
issue of ‘how actions reproduce or modify institutions over time’ may be illuminated 
(Jarzabkowski, 2008, p. 623). As Archer (2012, p. 54) contends, the point of the 
morphogenetic approach is precisely to specify the ‘who’s who’ and ‘who does what’, 
and, one might add, ‘when and why’ in social transformation: a goal of manifest 
salience for SAP. 
<<<<< >>>>> 
Figure 1  
<<<<< >>>>> 
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As illustrated in Figure 1, at T1-T2, structural and cultural emergent properties 
shape the situations in which strategists find themselves, conditioning their actions, 
though not in a deterministic manner given their own emergent powers. During this 
initial stage of the mediation of structure to agency, these influences manifest as first-
order emergents, encompassing: the strategist’s involuntaristic placement within the 
broader social context and role array, their vested interests, the opportunity costs 
associated with different courses of action, their perceived interpretive freedom and 
scope for strategic directional guidance. Such first-order emergents impact differently 
upon each agent, enabling or frustrating the attainment of their strategic projects in 
relation to their social bargaining power. Consequently, the analysis of how structural 
and cultural emergent properties impinge upon agents by shaping the situations which 
they confront is stratified across three levels (Archer, 2000b).  
First, social position, which pre-groups collectives of agents into the privileged 
and underprivileged, categories which are not fixed but are mobile over time. In this 
regard, Archer identifies ‘corporate’ and ‘primary’ agents. The former encompasses 
‘those who are aware of what they want, can articulate it to themselves and others, and 
have organized in order to get it’ (Archer, 1995, p. 258). Such self-conscious vested 
interest groups therefore act strategically, engaging in promotive organisation and 
articulation of their interests to become party to negotiated societal transformations, so 
shaping the context for all actors. The latter, by contrast, are ‘inarticulate in their 
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demands and unorganised for their pursuit’ and so remain excluded from this debate 
(Archer, 1995, p. 185). Second, roles, each necessarily and internally related to others 
(e.g., chief executive-employee) and to associated artefactual, social and conceptual 
resources (Fleetwood, 2005). Finally, the ‘cultural logics’ of the institutional domain, 
which, in guiding practice, mould professional and organizational arenas (Mutch, 2009, 
p.150). Therefore, in addressing conditional influences in this manner, the contextual 
constraints and enablements imposed on the social position of the strategist are exposed 
(Luckett, 2008). 
The potential bargaining power of collectivities of agents, and their resultant 
negotiating strength, fosters disparate groups (the cabals and coalitions found in any 
strategic arena) which are caught in a battle of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic wills. 
For Archer (2003), this represents the second stage of the mediation of structure to 
agency, and addresses how strategists, confronted by contextual conditioning, exercise 
their subjective and reflexive mental powers to formulate their strategic projects, 
individually and collectively. Throughout a given strategic episode, those experiencing 
exigencies seek to eradicate them, whilst those experiencing benefits seek to retain 
them: an argument that resonates with Bourdieu’s (1993) notion of the field and to the 
manifestation of power therein. But though Archer (2010a) argues that all such 
transactions are fuelled by power, contra Bourdieu, she also reasons that they are 
attenuated by agential reflexivity and self-monitoring to provide directional guidance.  
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Archer (1995, p. 216) states that this array of influences gives rise to four 
potential second-order emergents—‘necessary complementarities, necessary 
incompatibilities, contingent complementarities and contingent incompatibilities’—
which foster the accompanying situational logics of protection, correction/compromise, 
opportunism, and elimination. Hence at T2-T3, the situational logics held by such groups 
contort the strategic arena, motivating different forms of strategic action by 
predisposing each group of actors to see their interests best served by defensive, 
concessionary, opportunistic or competitive modes of interaction. Therefore, it is the 
situational logic ultimately brought to pass through strategic negotiation—be that via 
power induced compliance, reciprocal exchange, or the harmonisation of desires—that 
‘represents the generative mechanism of morphogenesis or morphostasis’ (Archer, 
1995, p. 218). 
At T3-T4, the final stage of the morphogenetic-morphostatic cycle, third-order 
emergents impact within the strategic arena. These arise from the ‘relative synchrony, 
congruity or incongruity’, between structural and cultural emergent properties (Archer, 
1995, p. 218). This therefore captures structural and ideational differentiation, together 
with the re-grouping inherent to the power play of strategic actors. Hence, when a 
morphogenetic cycle is completed, as structural relations are transformed so is agency 
in an act of ‘double morphogenesis’ (Archer, 1995, p. 74). Furthermore, ‘triple 
morphogenesis’ takes place in the emergence of social actors, who are forged from 
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agential collectivities in relation to the array of organizational roles which are available 
in society at that specific point in time (Archer, 1995, p. 256). Therefore, as an 
established methodological complement to critical realism—and as an innovative lens 
for SAP—an Archerian approach provides both an explanatory framework for 
examining the interplay between structure and agency, and a tool kit for developing the 
analytical histories of emergence of particular social formations and strategies (Archer, 
2010b). 
In her later work, Archer has refined her conceptualisation of the mediation of 
structure to agency. This, Archer contends, is undertaken via two mechanisms: 
habituation, guiding routine action, and reflexivity, guiding those actions which demand 
a more creative response (Archer, 2010a). However, it must be acknowledged that 
Archer’s primary focus is directed toward the reflexivity of self-conscious social 
subjects committed to the achievement of their personal projects. In this regard, Archer 
theorises reflexive agency as originating within the internal conversation of the 
individual’s domain of mental privacy, and posits that it is this that has causal efficacy 
towards ourselves, our society, and the relations between them (Archer, 2000a).  
For Archer this final stage of the mediation of structure to agency occurs through 
three stages: discernment, the preliminary review stage of an issue of concern, where 
reflective retrospective and prospective thought informs practical action; deliberation, 
involving the ranking of such concerns against others, and dedication, entailing their 
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prioritisation and alignment to foster a ‘fallible yet corrigible’ commitment to a chosen 
path (Archer, 2000a, p. 237-8). The reflexive agency informed by the internal 
conversation thus represents the explicit interplay of social context and personal 
concerns. Therefore, in addition to offering SAP an explanatory framework for 
examining the interplay between structure and agency and their outcomes in strategy 
formation, Archer’s realist social theory also provides an innovative means to address 
Whittington’s notion of looping in strategizing. 
An Archerian approach to the practice of strategy 
In this section, an Archerian approach to the practice of strategy is demonstrated 
through a case study of strategy formation and strategizing in the Welsh Government. 
Accompanying case information and data sources are summarised in Table 1.  
Orientation to the case 
The public inquiry into the Bristol Royal Infirmary (BRI)—colloquially know as the 
Kennedy Report—marks a watershed in the development of healthcare services across 
the United Kingdom (UK) and forms the antecedent context to the case. The Report’s 
recommendation that: ‘continuous professional development, being fundamental to the 
quality of care provided to patients, should be compulsory for all healthcare 
professionals’, positioned such development on the strategic agenda of the devolved 
National Health Service (NHS) (Kennedy, 2001, p. 447). The Welsh Government 
(2002), in publishing its response to the report, set out a policy commitment for a new 
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workforce and organizational development strategy for the Welsh NHS: the focal 
strategy considered in this case study. 
Structural conditioning (T1-T2), socio-cultural interaction (T2-T3), and structural 
reproduction or elaboration (T3-T4) fostered through the actions of four groups of agents 
tasked with the development of the strategy is depicted. This centres upon: (i) the 
administrative core, senior civil servants with direct managerial responsibility for the 
development of the strategy, wherein the author then functioned as the principal 
strategist; (ii) the policy leads, senior civil servants who were drawn from an array of 
professional orientations to guide the strategy’s formulation; (iii) the NHS managers, 
chief executive officers from NHS Wales’ then Trusts and Local Health Boards; and 
(iv) the inner elite, a cabal, composed of the chair of the board within the administrative 
core, one policy lead, and one NHS manager.  
As indicated in Table 1, formal board meetings, informal meetings and the 
impromptu daily banter of strategizing comprise the main data sources. These were 
analysed through abstraction and retroduction, individuating one or more aspects, 
components, or attributes, and their relationships in strategizing, in order to understand 
them better (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002). As summarised in 
Table 2, initially, structural conditioning was analysed by examining United Kingdom 
and Welsh healthcare policy to assess the impact of the emergent strategy. Hence, 
conflicting dominant and subordinate institutional logics, which foster the organizing 
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principles for these strategic arenas, were defined (Mutch, 2009). This preliminary 
analysis scoped out the first-order emergents within the strategic arena. 
Then the relational structure of the Welsh Government board was considered 
across: (i) social position, role, and the organizational and professional composition of 
the board’s membership; and (ii) the role-based power disparity between the players on 
the board. Structural, cultural and agential conditioning was thus examined as it 
manifested deep within this bureaucratic and hierarchically organized social space, 
thereby revealing second-order emergents. Socio-cultural interaction was analysed 
through the practitioners, praxis and practices of strategy. However, attention was 
placed upon the strategic practices orchestrating hegemonic control within the board, 
and that of a broader array of Welsh stakeholders, exposing the differing stances to 
strategic negotiation adopted by each cabal or coalition (Joseph, 2000). Finally, 
structural reproduction or elaboration was examined, and attention placed upon the 
aftermath following the strategy’s approval by the board. This analytical process is 
further reflected upon in the discussion to this paper. 
<<<<< >>>>> 
Table 1 and Table 2 
<<<<< >>>>> 
Structural conditioning (T1-T2) 
 19 
In the aftermath of the Kennedy Report, structural and cultural change impacted, 
conditioning the actions of those in the strategic arena. Importantly, medical autonomy 
and professional dominance had been eroded by political and public disdain, 
precipitating the increasingly stringent modes of regulation and revalidation that are 
now imposed upon the UK’s healthcare professionals (HMSO, 2007). In the strategic 
arena, the diminished standing of the medical profession served to undermine the 
aligned group of policy leads.  
Other groups of agents were, however, confronted by different challenges. The 
administrative core and policy leads drawn from a broader array of professional 
orientations, collectively tasked with the development of a distinctive Welsh policy 
agenda, were constrained by UK Government’s reserved powers (Greer, 2004). In 
relation to the focal strategy, this primarily arose from the UK Government’s control of 
the regulation of the healthcare professional workforce (HMSO, 2007). Indeed, the 
contemporary development of a new UK wide pay and performance system for NHS 
Staff—Agenda for Change and the Knowledge and Skills Framework—limited the 
scope of the emergent strategy (Department of Health, 2002). Furthermore, NHS 
Managers were preoccupied with the protracted structural reform of the Welsh NHS 
that commenced with devolution (Drakeford, 2006) and thus faced organizational 
mergers and the threat of redundancy or redeployment. 
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As summarized in Table 2, the different situations in which the four groups of 
agents now found themselves in relation to such change, and their social position, role-
based, and institutional—professional and organizational—stance toward the 
development of the strategy, created dynamic space for strategic negotiation. 
Consequently, the strategic arena became, albeit fleetingly, more malleable.  
First-order emergents: The administrative core 
The Welsh Government’s commitment to the focal strategy directly impacted upon the 
involuntaristic placement of the inner elite in the administrative core, the appointed 
chair of the strategy’s board, for whom a Ministerial order in the form of a ‘JDI’—just 
do it—weighed heavily. 
‘The Minister wants action—we need to be seen to be responding to the 
report [Kennedy, 2001] in a positive manner—we’ve got a JDI.’  
Inner Elite, Administrative Core: Informal discussion with principal strategist 2003 
Their vested interests lay in the development of the strategy in alignment with the 
Welsh Government’s centrist and bureaucratic set of values and beliefs, and the broader 
policy commitment to collaborative public sector partnership working which, though 
ostensibly fostered through trust and co-operation, was cemented by quasi-statutory 
legal frameworks (Quinn, 2002). Their strategic agency was therefore directed to 
meeting Ministerial demands with due obedience. Hence, their role-position to the 
Minister exemplified an internal and necessary relationship, and key structural emergent 
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property, compatible with the strongly institutionalized and overt bureaucratization of 
this government/public administration context (Horrocks, 2009). The interplay of their 
conditioned situational interpretation and agential reflexivity during the first stage of the 
mediation of structure to agency, expressed below, forwarded the discretionary 
judgement that the strategic arena offered only limited scope for change that would be 
best served through brokering a path of compromise. 
 ‘You have to appreciate that we can’t just do what we want...[long pause]... 
the scope of this strategy is limited, and you’ve got to understand that before 
we start. We’re constrained—Agenda for Change and the Knowledge and 
Skills Framework are placing a significant burden on Directors of Human 
Resource across the NHS, and this strategy will just appear to be an add-
on—and we’ve got to address the policy commitment to partnership 
working. This is going to be about determining how far we can go, how we 
can keep the key players on board, and how we get them to agree. It’s about 
compromise.’ 
Inner Elite, Administrative Core: Informal discussion with principal strategist 2003 
Given the gravitas of their role-position and the institutionalised adherence to a 
traditional bureaucratic hierarchical corporatism, attenuated by professional collegiality, 
that characterised the strategic arena, their strategic stance delimited that which could be 
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entertained by the principal strategist and others positioned within the administrative 
core. 
First-order emergents: The policy leads 
Such bureaucratic hierarchical corporatism was, itself, conditioned by the 
involuntaristic placement of the policy leads. For some, the strategy’s formation 
represented a ‘concrete hegemonic project’ and thus a strategic opportunity to be 
leveraged (Joseph, 2003, p. 129). But this strategic stance was far from universal. 
Pivotally, for the policy leads for medicine, the emergence of the strategy threatened the 
continuation of their privileged access to funding for postgraduate professional 
development.  
‘Medical workforce planning has always been sorted at the level of the 
[Welsh Government] and arguably at a UK level through the Royal 
Colleges for the planning of numbers within each specialism. So the 
numbers, control, and funding of this has been, I guess you’d call it, “ring 
fenced”. It’s a “special relationship”. It’s protected from the churn in the 
wider NHS, and this relationship can’t be eroded. Funding can’t be diverted 
to other ranks of NHS staff. Continuous professional development, lifelong 
learning throughout a professional career, this is what medicine is about. It 
has to be a priority and protected accordingly.’ 
Policy Lead (Medicine) (1): Interview 2004 
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In exceeding £100 million per annum this represented a key resource for potential 
reallocation to other staff groups. Their vested interests therefore sought to shape the 
strategy’s content and ensure minimal change. Consequently, across the policy leads, 
perceived opportunity costs, degrees of interpretive freedom and ensuing strategic 
directional guidance were polarised, giving rise to internally focused competition.  
First-order emergents: The NHS managers 
In contrast, the involuntaristic placement of the NHS managers fostered a more clearly 
defined strategic stance. This group sought to leverage their vested interests by shaping 
the scope of the strategy, focusing it to address an employer-led, as opposed to a 
healthcare professional-led, workforce and organizational development agenda.  
‘I need to reconfigure my organization, change the interface with the Local 
Health Boards on my patch. All of this demands a realignment of roles, 
professional groups. So, I need this strategy to lever that degree of change.’ 
Inner Elite, NHS Manager: Informal discussion with principal strategist 2004 
They therefore asserted their will through normative and cultural means to control the 
unfolding agenda of the project board and address perceived barriers to the strategy’s 
development.  
First-order emergents: The inner elite 
The three inner elites—the chair of the board within the administrative core, a policy 
lead, and an NHS manager—each operated at the pinnacle of their respective 
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professional hierarchy, and formed a discrete cabal within the strategic arena. Indeed, 
drawing upon the wider literature of elite power beyond that informed by critical 
realism, these social actors, the ‘Teflon Dons’1 of the Welsh Government’s boards, task-
and-finish groups, and policy networks—‘the little group which makes a practice of 
attending meetings’ (Michels, 1915, p.51)—regularly circulated through the nodal 
points of power, privileging their putative strategic agency to buffer against the 
‘rivalries and contestations’ of others committed to their own protracted power games 
(Courpasson & Clegg, 2006, p. 320). As such, each was central to the orchestration of 
power across their individual networks, and so drew into play longstanding 
interpersonal relationships of trust, reciprocity, and mutual interest to maintain the unity 
of this social formation (Joseph, 2003). Their vested interests were therefore focused 
toward ensuring the maintenance of the boundaries of their elite power within the 
strategic arena. 
The involuntaristic placement of the inner elite in the administrative core 
impacted upon the others. In a critical act of corporate agency—a mobilisation of bias 
that emerged as the ‘power to choose’ (Lukes, 1974)—the inner elite in the 
administrative core controlled the construction of the strategy’s board: (i) from within 
their personal networks of allied inner elites, so fostering a hegemonic bloc that 
operated in adherence to Ministerial orders; (ii) from other players known to concede 
1  An insider’s colloquialism that draws upon the language and symbolism of Francis Ford Coppola’s film ‘The 
Godfather’, and the metaphorical coating of political polytetrafluoroethylene that envelops such players. 
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legitimacy to those better positioned within this bureaucratic and hierarchically 
structured social space; and also (iii) from the principal strategist’s personal networks. 
In so doing, a foothold was established upon the complex power dynamics between the 
other agents on the board that off-set the opportunity costs of engagement in such 
strategic episodes. Importantly, as expanded upon below, the constitution of this 
hegemonic bloc, formed from their shifting tripartite network of alliances which 
embraced and burdened all, lay at the heart of the board’s strategizing. 
Second-order emergents: Discordant situational logics  
The structural and cultural emergent properties catalysed by the Kennedy Report 
impacted differently upon the four groups of agents, and was amplified by their 
respective social position, role-based, and institutional stance toward the development 
of the strategy (Archer, 2000b). First, the agents were not equal with regard to their 
social position and role-based power. For the three inner elites, given the bureaucratic 
hierarchical corporatism that enveloped the board and their dominance in role 
relationships with the policy leads or NHS managers, their ‘negotiating strength’, 
primarily exerted through political sanction, organizational resource control and 
expertise, overrode that of the others (Archer, 1995, p. 297). This functioned as a 
constraining influence between the other vested interest groups, confronting them with 
situational benefits or penalties of subtle subordination which, again, modulated their 
relationships vis-à-vis each other. 
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As illustrated in Table 2, different second-order emergents manifested for each 
group of agents giving rise to different situational logics. First, the inner elite in the 
administrative core, to buttress their strategic position and negotiating strength, enacted 
a self-referential situational logic of protection. At the level of agential interaction, their 
corporate agency and reflexivity was expressed through the situational reproduction of 
the inner elite cabal, so building a sense of solidarity within the board and structural 
hegemony across the relational array represented by the Welsh Government’s policy 
and NHS Wales’ organizational arenas. This manoeuvre, characteristic of a strong 
central bureaucracy where the vested interests of those in power seek to maintain the 
status quo, therefore created a strategic arena that was inherently morphostatic. 
In the administrative core, given the asymmetric role dynamic between the inner 
elite and the others in this group, a situational logic of correction/compromise arose that 
adhered to the view that the strategic arena offered only limited scope for change. The 
administrative core therefore sought to assuage the tensions between opposing factions 
represented by the policy leads for medicine (and other health care clinical 
professionals) and NHS managers through a cautious balancing act that fostered a 
strong sense of unification at the socio-cultural level. Accordingly, the strategic agency 
of the administrative core offered only subtle potential for change. 
However, the two other groups manifested countervailing situational logics. A 
coalition formed by medical and other healthcare clinical professionals operated a 
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consistent situational logic of elimination towards those aspects of the emergent strategy 
that challenged their privileged access to funding for postgraduate professional 
development. In seeking to maintain the entrenched systematisation and integration of 
professional jurisdictions across NHS Wales, their social interaction and ensuing 
strategic agency centred on professional expertise to leverage their position under the 
hegemonic dominance of the inner elites. In contrast, the NHS managers, in leveraging 
organizational resource control and corporate managerial expertise under a situational 
logic of opportunism, actively sought to foster an employer-led workforce development 
agenda that facilitated role flexibility and change at the structural and cultural system 
level via specialisation and differentiation within the Welsh NHS. These countervailing 
situational logics therefore held the potential to catalyse morphogenesis in the strategic 
arena. 
Socio-cultural interaction (T2-T3)  
To further illuminate how strategy and strategizing are shaped by the interplay of 
structure and agency, two specific aspects are now discussed. The first centres on the 
corporate agency of the three inner elites as a cabal, and exemplifies the discursive 
practice of political sanction through which the Teflon Dons exerted power induced 
compliance over opposing factions within the board. However, the second addresses the 
secondary tactic of reciprocal exchange and the ensuing harmonisation of desires that 
was adopted by the administrative core and disaffected policy leads due to fracturing of 
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the inner elite cabal as the structural reconfiguration of the Welsh NHS impacted upon 
the strategic arena, so destabilizing the power dynamics in play. 
Power induced compliance  
The inner elite, as a cabal, occupied a distinctive role-set and projected a defined and 
cohesive social identity. Within the confines of the board, and beyond, these players 
were dominant. Collectively, they therefore possessed a degree of raw bargaining power 
and negotiating strength that could subdue discordant voices. Their power was wielded 
to manifest effect, and whilst strategizing both overt domination and covert mobilisation 
of bias were in play (Lukes, 1974). The coalition formed by medical and other health 
care clinical professionals, fearing the loss of their privileged position, expressed their 
respective professions’ intractable vested interests within boardroom exchanges. 
However, the inner elite in the administrative core curtailed this debate through the use 
of the social position and role-based power, political and policy expertise, and the 
subliminal threat of Ministerial sanction. This rebuke provoked the rapid agreement of 
another within the cabal and thus, under their collective situational logic of protection, 
reinforced their hegemonic dominance.   
‘The [Welsh Government] have indicated the need for this strategy—it’s 
explicit in the response to Kennedy Report—and, given the delay in 
commissioning this work, this needs to be delivered as a matter of some 
urgency. This strategy has to be developed in alignment to current policy. It 
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will also need to reflect the regulatory frameworks for various professional 
groups, take into account Agenda for Change and the Knowledge and Skills 
Framework, and tie into NHS Wales’ Balanced Scorecard. So, we have a lot 
to deliver.’ 
Inner Elite, Administrative Core: Project Board Meeting (3) 2003 
‘We can’t just carry on as before—politically, professionally, publically—
we’ve got to change, and not simply the funding for postgraduate education 
but the role and remit of medical, and other staff, in the service.’ 
Inner Elite, Policy Lead: Project Board Meeting (3) 2003 
However this conflict—the potential loss of a culturally entrenched 
professional privilege—crystallized opposition. Across successive board meetings 
the inner elite in the administrative core, as chair of the board, exerted influence to 
orchestrate events, manipulating the particularised membership ties that connected 
the other inner elite players across the bureaucratic hierarchy to augment their 
stance. The other inner elites, in turn, used their internal and necessary structural 
relationships across their respective professional groups to subdue potential 
resistance in a manner that stymied the latent conflict. This strategic practice 
disciplined the board, corralling divergent vested interests in accordance with the 
asymmetrical powers, potentials, and liabilities of each board level actor. 
Therefore, in this contested strategic arena fraught with bureaucratic, hierarchical 
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and professional authority—and the cynical calculation and instrumental 
manipulation of politics—who was enabled to manifest their situational logic and 
act to monopolise events to meet their concrete hegemonic project was shaped by 
social position and inequality with respect to role-based power relations (Joseph, 
2003; Potter, 2010).   
Reciprocal exchange and the harmonisation of desires 
As the formation of the strategy progressed, the structural reconfiguration of the Welsh 
NHS impacted upon the strategic arena. For the inner elite in the administrative core, 
other more pressing objectives now interceded, gained political prominence, and were 
pushed to the front of the delivery agenda by their political strategic champions. 
Moreover, for the NHS managers, organizational merger, role displacement or 
redundancy impacted, diminishing their collective potential bargaining power and 
negotiating strength, so dissipating the impetus for the change that they had sought. 
This legitimate ‘desertion’ (Archer, 1996, p. 198) placed the administrative core and 
disaffected policy leads into a strategic stalemate. Therefore, a more nuanced 
negotiation across the diverse vested interests groups ensued during informal meetings 
and opportunistic ad hoc encounters, each far removed from the oversight, censure and 
constraints of the formal boardroom debates. 
The administrative core, guided by their situational logic of 
correction/compromise and the view that strategic arena offered only limited scope for 
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change, thus sought to focus the strategy toward the delivery of structural change. As a 
seemingly ever present state of affairs in the devolved NHS, this fostered less resistance 
from the disaffected policy leads’ coalition, and was perceived by them to be a 
necessary prior step toward the longer-term strategic goal of cultural change.  
‘I am concerned about this, I won’t deny it: I don’t want to see postgraduate 
medical education compromised because funds are diverted elsewhere. I’ll 
only commit to the formation of a new body with strategic oversight of 
workforce planning for NHS Wales to focus on alignment to Agenda for 
Change, and then let’s continue the debate on workforce planning, capacity 
and capability.’ 
Policy Lead (Medicine) (1): Interview 2004 
Coercive communicative practices thus gave way to reciprocal exchange and a 
strategic path that would focus upon the centralisation of workforce supply and demand 
planning to facilitate the evolution of new roles and their associated education 
pathways, thereby postponing the cultural encroachment upon the traditional healthcare 
professions’ privileged access to funding. Though drawn from the SAP field, as 
opposed to critical realist informed studies, this harmonization of desires depicts the 
practice of ‘strategic ambiguity’—deferral, delay and indecision—fostered by the 
diffuse power and divergent vested interest of each group (Denis, Dompierre, Langley, 
& Rouleau, 2011, p. 225). 
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Structural reproduction or elaboration (T3-T4) 
In the final phase of the morphogenetic cycle, the objective is to set out the tendential 
conditions under which morphogenesis or morphostasis arises from socio-cultural 
interaction, as conditioned by the prior social context, and thus account for the actual 
configuration of social elaboration. Hence, it must be acknowledged that Wales, as a 
polity, is small and cohesive due to the political ideological cohesion of its centre-left 
political parties (Drakeford, 2006). Furthermore, the Welsh NHS is deeply entrenched 
and ideologically beholden to the ‘true NHS’ forged at the inception of this institution 
by Aneurin Bevan, a Welsh politician, and its central Ministerial architect (Chaney & 
Drakeford, 2004, p. 125; Welsh Labour Party, 2005). An internal, necessary, compatible 
and strongly institutionalized relationship thus exists between the Welsh Government 
and the Welsh NHS.  
Consequently, the strategic arena examined in this paper was characterised by 
high levels of social and systemic integration. Indeed, with regard to health policy and 
strategy in Wales, the dominant macro level cultural emergent property in the strategic 
arena was the protection and maintenance of the ideological ‘purity’ of the NHS. 
Furthermore, given that political ideology and its embedded institutions function as 
vectors for structural conditioning, the dominant macro level structural emergent 
property operated hand-in-glove as centralised governmental statist control. Thus, with 
regard to health policy and strategy, invoking one political party’s centre-left 
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ideological ethos also evoked that of others, so buttressing adherence to this stance to 
engender a self referential causal consensus that contorts the strategic arena giving rise 
to little more than ‘cultural embroidery’ (Archer, 1996, p.158). 
Therefore, although the strategy was shaped through the enactment of a situational 
logic of correction/compromise, its scope, from the outset, was delimited by: (i) 
hegemony that fostered cultural morphostasis; and (ii) the monolithic form of social 
organization, with its superimposition of elites and concentration of resources, that 
generated an internal crystallization of opposition that dissipated through negotiation 
and exchange to deliver incremental structural change in the form of a fragile 
morphostasis. The strategic arena was therefore hemmed in by a strong central 
bureaucracy, and the vested interests of those in power who acted to maintain the status 
quo, so that the strategist confronted an arena that was irrefutably morphostatic. Thus, 
once formed and implemented, the strategy catalysed little more than a reorganization 
of the ‘parts’ and the ‘people’.  
Discussion and conclusion 
The Archerian approach illustrated in this paper offers SAP ontological flexibility and a 
methodology based on analytical dualism that facilitates the examination of the 
interplay between structure and agency in the practice of strategy. This defined role is 
acknowledged to possess the potential to enrich our understanding of strategizing within 
a strategic arena shaped by ‘structural obduracy, hierarchical powers and interests’ 
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(Whittington, 2010, p.115). While such an approach is particularly apt for studies of 
bureaucratic public administration, it is merely one amidst a spectrum of other realist 
stances that may further inform SAP. Though explicitly refuted by Archer (2010b), the 
work of Bourdieu and Archer may be bridged by Fleetwood’s (2008) empirical 
combination, Adams’ (2006) hybridization, and Elder-Vass’ (2007) ontological and 
theoretical reconciliation. Similarly, Stones (2005) builds upon the work of Giddens by 
adding Archer’s, and others’, critical realist informed insights to set out a strong variant 
of structuration theory. Therefore, though realism is, to date, a neglected theme in SAP 
it presents the field with new opportunities for looping together macro extra-
organizational societal forces with micro intra-organizational strategic managerial 
activities in strategizing. 
In exploring how structural and cultural emergent properties condition the context 
of action, an Archerian approach directs attention to: (i) internal and necessary 
relationships, which entail material resources whether physical or human, which 
generate causal powers proper to the relation itself; and (ii) the pre-existence, autonomy 
and durability of symbolic constructions and associated material practices which 
constitute the cultural system (Archer, 1995, p. 175-177). This ‘resource’ and ‘schema’ 
distinction resonates with sociological institutionalism, enabling SAP to connect to the 
strategy research agenda informed by institutional theory (Clemens & Cook, 1999, p. 
443). Importantly, it reflects the perception of institutional logics as multiple, nested and 
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contested, and helps to reveal the causal mechanism that generates the ‘situational logic’ 
that results in the reproduction or transformation of the institutional field and strategies 
therein (Friedland & Alford, 1991). In this regard, it offers a methodological 
accompaniment to the current debate on institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 
2010). Furthermore, its emphasis on context, spanning the external environment, inter-
organizational field, and intra-organizational infrastructure enhances its applicability for 
the broader strategic management research agenda, whilst the overt temporal and 
processual aspects lend themselves to strategy process research (Joseph & Ocasio, 
2012). As a sophisticated variant of critical realism, an Archerian approach may even 
offer strategy research the means to test its theoretical foundations (Miller & Tsang, 
2010). 
In addition, Archer’s progressive refinement of the mediation of structure to 
agency, conveyed through the interplay of social context and personal concerns in the 
internal conversation, may help to expose how strategists use their subjective and 
reflexive mental powers to formulate their strategic projects, individually and 
collectively. For in revealing that which ‘we conclude internally (and always fallibly) 
will enable us to do (and be) what we care about most in society’, this approach offers 
SAP, and the parent strategy field, insight into practice selection and use shaped by 
industry context, managerial cognition, and emergent strategic action (Archer, 2003, p. 
133; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Thus, perhaps the most pertinent contribution of such a 
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penetrating critical realist lens is its potential to contextualise strategists’ actions by 
helping to reveal the depths of institutional, organizational and individual complexity, 
so fostering insightful circumspection and further investigation into the elusive ‘why’ 
inherent to conscious, tactical, strategizing. 
In this regard, Archer has identified four modes of agential reflexivity—
communicative, autonomous, meta and fractured—which are contextually dependent 
and inform distinctive stances toward society (Archer, 2012). Communicative 
reflexivity arises in situations of contextual continuity and is associated with a 
situational logic of protection or correction that fosters morphostasis. Autonomous 
reflexivity arises in situations of contextual discontinuity and is associated with a 
situational logic of competition that drives instrumental rationality to generate a brittle 
morphostasis open to transformation. Meta-reflexivity arises in situations of contextual 
incongruity and is associated with a situational logic of opportunity fostering 
morphogenesis. In contrast, fractured reflexives, as the name suggests, fail to attain 
reflexivity as their powers are suspended by the onslaught of contingencies which 
render them merely passive agents (Archer, 2003). Archer’s taxonomy therefore 
connects SAP to, and further informs, the wide array of strategy research on managerial 
sensemaking and cognition (Kaplan, 2011), and offers scope for comparison across 
national boundaries (Porpora & Shumar, 2010; Smith, 2010). 
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Yet limitations must be acknowledged. Archer (2000a, p. 162) posits that the 
three orders of reality—‘natural, practical, and social’—give rise to distinct and 
heterogeneous forms of knowledge, which, in turn, entail a different balance of 
habituation and reflexivity. Reflexivity is minimal in the natural order, moderate in the 
practical order, and maximal in the social order (Archer, 2010b). Therefore, an 
Archerian approach is somewhat insensitive to strategists’ non-reflexive socialisation. 
Indeed, it is focused upon strategists’ ‘practical evaluative’ acts of conscious, 
intentional, strategic creativity, as they manoeuvre by hypothesising and making 
practical and normative judgements among possible trajectories of action in response to 
the demands of an evolving situation (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 970). As 
commented by Clarke (2008), Archer’s approach is thus unable to address irrationality 
and inconsistent action. As such, it underestimates an agent’s potential to live 
‘contradictory lives’ in which not all practices are consistent steps toward achieving 
one’s strategic goal (Luckett, 2008, p. 304).  
Importantly, an Archerian approach reveals the nuances of power in SAP, 
highlighting the fracture between what strategists are free to envision and that which 
they ultimately bring to fruition when confronted by the constraints of the extant social 
structure. Thus, for the strategy researcher, it illuminates the elite with the power to 
dominate the debate, set the strategic agenda, and covertly manipulate the playing of 
this intriguing game (Lukes, 1974). Moreover, it reveals how others, differently 
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positioned within the field, respond to such constraints or enablements by perceiving 
the latitude in the margins and flexing the boundaries of their strategic discretion 
through the improvised in situ coping of their reflexive deliberation (Chia, 2004). 
Therefore, this view of agency acknowledges that a strategist cannot sculpt social reality 
at will (Campbell, 2009).  
For Archer, primary agency is moulded by corporate agency. And, in SAP this 
notion is pivotal, if strategy truly is the ‘manifestation of the managerial claim to power’ 
and, in turn, the ‘motor of field dynamics’ and quintessential ‘logic’ in play (Archer, 
1995, p. 179; Friedland, 2009, p. 888; McCabe, 2010, p. 172; Santos & Eisenhardt, 
2009, p. 666). Consequently, through this approach, the interplay of structure and 
agency is sensitised to the emergence of the contested hegemonic control that fosters 
advocacy for, and resistance to, strategic change, so providing the requisite insight into 
strategic direction and ensuing outcome (Joseph, 2000). 
Operationalizing an Archerian approach to the practice of strategy 
To produce the ‘transitive corrigible narrative’ that is the ‘methodological hall mark of 
morphogenetic realism’ is, undeniably, time consuming and complicated (Archer, 1995, 
p. 294). Yet the most significant challenge is the abstraction and retroduction inherent to 
the data analysis. Abstraction draws out the various components within the strategic 
arena, facilitating the conceptualization of their interplay, through combination and 
interaction, so that the researcher may gain new insight (Sayer, 2000). Retroduction 
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builds upon this analytical stage, to reconstruct the basic conditions for such phenomena 
to be what they are, so fostering knowledge of the transfactual conditions, structures and 
mechanisms in play (Danermark et al., 1997). [See Danermark et al., (1997), Fleetwood 
& Ackroyd, (2004), and Sayer (2000) for an introduction to abstraction and retroduction 
in critical realism]. 
In essence, the goal is to posit a mechanism (typically at a different level of the 
phenomenon being explained), which, if it existed and acted in the postulated manner, 
could account for the phenomenon singled out for explanation (Reed, 2005). However, 
such analysis is open to individual interpretation, being performed under a logic of 
analogy and metaphor that is steeped in the investigator’s perspective, beliefs, and 
experience (Lawson, 1997). Thus, an explanatory structure is devised through a 
combination of theory and experimental observation (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). But to be 
adequate this approach must abstract from particular conditions, excluding those which 
are believed to have no significant effect, in order to focus on those which do, and 
identify relations of different types:  ‘substantial’, ‘formal’, ‘external or contingent’ and 
‘internal or necessary’ (Sayer, 2000). As reflected by Archer, once this step has been 
achieved, it may be possible to combine or synthesise the various separate 
understandings into a unity that reconstitutes, or provides a better understanding of, the 
concrete (Archer et al., 1998, p. 170). In this empirical case study, this process was 
aided by the hierarchical bureaucratization of the strategic arena, which readily exposed 
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the internal and necessary relationships underpinning structural and cultural emergent 
properties. 
A further issue with an Archerian approach, and with critical realism more 
broadly, is its lack of a theoretical depth in regard to social integration (Archer, 2010c). 
For Layder (2006), this is expressed by Archer’s downgrading of the theoretical and 
empirical importance of interpersonal encounters, provoking his assertion that the 
domain of situated activity has been rendered too mute, thereby obscuring the emergent 
properties catalysed by social interaction. Similar discord is stressed by Mouzelis 
(2008), who argues that Archer has focused her consideration of agency upon the 
internal conversation to such an extent that intra-action is theorised at the expense of the 
interaction. Therefore, although Archer parallels Bourdieu’s (field, agential position, 
capital) and Giddens’ (signification, domination, legitimation) with a nuanced approach 
to power, the more subtle aspects of the relational structure that bind discrete strategic 
agents demand careful consideration. 
In addition, though not wishing to disparage the skilled work of SAP researchers 
undertaking an ethnographic approach, the depth of embeddedness—in terms of a 
strategy practitioner’s organizational access, personal networks, and contextual 
understanding of their field—that is required for an Archerian approach is potentially 
problematic. In undertaking this approach, appreciating the act of intellectual arbitrage 
in play, my then role as the principal strategist tasked to develop the focal strategy was 
 41 
pivotal (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). Yet for SAP academics, irrespective of how 
well informed and intermittently immersed within a strategic episode, they routinely 
remain an ‘outsider’ (Ezzamel & Willmott, 2004, p. 45): part participant, part voyeur, 
forever lacking this essential element of ‘withness’ (Shotter, 2006, p. 585). [See 
Jarzabkowski and Seidl (2008), and Hoon (2007) for notable exceptions.] However, this 
issue is not confined to an Archerian approach. Indeed, the need for SAP to engage with 
strategists as research partners, not merely participants, has been recognised since the 
inception of the field (Balogun, Huff, & Johnson, 2003).  
To conclude, this paper contributes to the theoretical and methodological 
enrichment of SAP by introducing and illustrating an Archerian approach to the practice 
of strategy. By maintaining the ontic differentiation between structure and agency this 
approach renders the conditions of action analytically separable from the action itself, 
thereby facilitating the analysis of their interplay, one upon the other, at variance 
through time, in strategy formation and strategizing. In this manner, insight into the 
discrete actions of strategic agents is revealed, offering SAP an analytical grasp upon 
the constraints and enablements which foster change—social and strategic—or the 
maintenance of the status quo. An Archerian approach therefore represents a useful 
addition to the more traditional approaches to SAP, and offers the field the means of 
exploring the increasingly complex empirical implications of some practice theoretical 
claims.  
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Table 1: Case study information and data sources 
Case site: Welsh Government, NHS Wales and its public sector partner 
agencies. 
Period: 2003-2007. 
Data source (1): Strategy formation meetings 
 Active participation in and transcription of: 
 (i) 6 formal strategy formation board meetings;  
 (ii) 4 informal meetings with board’s chair.  
Data source (2): Strategy formation semi-structured interviews and informal 
conversations 
 (i) 75 semi-structured interviews on strategy formation; 
 (ii) 50 semi-structured interviews centred on strategizing within 
the Welsh Government, NHS Wales and its public sector 
partner agencies. 
 (iii) 23 impromptu discussions with agents across case site. 
Data source (3): Strategy implementation 
 Active participation in and transcription of: 
 (i) 2 formal board meetings to observe the implementation of the 
strategy across an inter-organizational network comprised of 
one NHS Trust, its three Local Health Boards, and co-
terminous Local Government organizations.  
 (ii) Direct participant-observation of a two-day focus group of 
eighty stakeholders drawn from this inter-organizational 
network. 
Data source (4): Supplemental documentary information 
 UK and Welsh health and social care policy and strategy documents. 
Central Actors:  Welsh Government Strategy Board  
 Board members comprised five categorical groupings, four of which 
are addressed in the paper:  
 (i) the ‘administrative core’, senior civil servants with direct 
managerial responsibility for the development of the strategy;  
 (ii) the ‘policy leads’, senior civil servants who were drawn from 
an array of professional orientations to guide the strategy’s 
formulation;  
 (iii) the ‘NHS managers’, chief executive officers from NHS 
Wales’ then Trusts and Local Health Boards;  
 (iv) the ‘partner organizations’ chief executive officers, or their 
academic equivalents, from NHS Wales’ public service partner 
agencies [not included in empirical data presented]; and 
 (v) the ‘inner elite’, composed of the chair of the board within the 
administrative core, one policy lead (healthcare), and one NHS 
manager (an NHS Trust chief executive officer). 
Peripheral Actors: NHS Wales and partner agencies  
 (i) Cross-section of NHS staff (chief executive to front-line roles); 
 (ii) Chief executive or director level with partner organizations.  
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T
able 2: A
n A
rcherian approach: Signposting how
 the em
pirical m
aterial relates to phases T
1-T
2, T
2-T
3 and T
3-T
4 
A
dm
inistrative C
ore 
Policy Leads 
N
H
S M
anagers 
Inner Elites 
Structural conditioning (T
1-T
2): Identify the structural and cultural features which characterize the strategic arena, and determ
ine how these condition socio-
cultural interaction across the different vested interest groups in accordance with their social position, role, and institutional norm
s    
First-order em
ergents 
Lim
ited scope for change best served 
through brokering a path of 
com
prom
ise 
Perceived opportunity costs, degrees 
of interpretive freedom
 and ensuing 
strategic directional guidance 
polarized, giving rise to internally 
focused com
petition 
D
evelopm
ent of the strategy into an 
em
ployer-led, as opposed to a 
healthcare professional-led, 
w
orkforce and organizational 
developm
ent agenda 
D
evelopm
ent and delivery of the 
strategy in alignm
ent w
ith the W
elsh 
G
overnm
ent’s centrist and 
bureaucratic set of values and beliefs 
Second-order em
ergents 
Situational logic of 
correction/com
prom
ise 
Situational logic of elim
ination 
Situational logic of opportunism
 
Situational logic of protection 
Socio-cultural interaction (T
2-T
3): Identify the form
s of strategic negotiation and exchange which characterize the strategic arena, focused upon power induced 
com
pliance, reciprocal exchange, and the harm
onization of desire, and determ
ine how these shape the ensuing strategic direction  
Strategic negotiation  
Enact harm
onization of desires to 
broker com
prom
ise via structural 
change, m
aintaining am
biguity over 
cultural change 
Enact reciprocal exchange to broker 
com
prom
ise 
Enact desertion due to heightened 
structural constraints 
Enact pow
er induced com
pliance, 
inform
ed by political sanction, 
organizational resource control and 
expertise, to control the debate 
Structural reproduction or elaboration (T
3-T
4): Identify the form
s of structural and ideational differentiation, together with agential re-grouping, which give 
rise to structural, cultural and agential elaboration or reproduction 
Third-order em
ergents 
Lim
ited structural change, w
ith 
deferred cultural change and agential 
reproduction 
Lim
ited structural change, w
ith 
deferred cultural change and agential 
reproduction 
Structural, cultural and agential 
elaboration due to reconfiguration of 
N
H
S W
ales 
M
aintenance of structural, cultural 
and agential hegem
ony 
 
The resultant strategy therefore fostered a fragile m
orphostasis—
a reorganization of the ‘parts’ and the ‘people’—
across the W
elsh N
H
S 
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Figure 1: T
he M
orphogenetic-M
orphostatic C
ycle 
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s their bargaining pow
er, 
their vested interests, the 
opportunity costs associated w
ith 
different courses of action, and 
thus their perceived interpretive 
freedom
 and scope for strategic 
directional guidance 
 
Second-order Em
ergents 
The situational logics of 
protection, correction or 
com
prom
ise, opportunism
, and 
elim
ination w
hich predispose 
groups of strategic actors to see 
their interests best served by 
defensive, concessionary, 
opportunistic or com
petitive 
m
odes of interaction  
Third-order Em
ergents 
Structural and ideational 
differentiation, together w
ith the 
re-grouping inherent to the pow
er 
play of corporate and prim
ary 
agents, giving rise to structural, 
cultural and agential elaboration or 
reproduction  
Strategic N
egotiation 
Strategic negotiation via pow
er 
induced com
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exchange, and the harm
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